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Framing in Young Adults 1Abstract  
We used the theoretical framework of fuzzy-trace theory to explore framing effects in 
young adults and their relationship to real world risk perceptions and behaviors. One 
hundred and two Cornell University undergraduates completed a decision making task 
involving hypothetical money and completed a survey that assessed their level of gist-
based (intuitive) thinking about risk, verbatim (quantitative) risk perceptions, sexual 
history, and various personality traits. The decision making task used a within-subjects 
framing design; each participant chose between taking a sure option and gamble for 
problems varying in magnitude and risk level. Each problem in the gain frame was 
analogous to one in the loss frame. An overall standard framing pattern (risk aversion for 
gains, risk seeking for losses) was observed. Preference for the gamble also decreased 
with increasing levels of risk and magnitude of outcomes. Individual differences in task 
performance related to a number of survey measures. Most importantly, susceptibility to 
framing was linked to sexual activity, a measure of risky sexual behavior. Standard 
framers had the fewest number of sexual partners while reverse framers had the most. 
Furthermore, sexual activity negatively correlated with gist-based thinking about risk. 
Gambling in the gain frame correlated positively with sensation seeking scores, which 
correlated negatively with gist-based thinking. Overall gambling negatively correlated 
with intentions to use birth control. These results have implications for using framing 
tasks to study real world behavior and for the use of gist-based interventions to reduce 
young adult risk taking.  
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Significance of Risky Decisions  
Unhealthy risk taking in young adulthood is a serious public health concern in the 
United States. College-aged students are at a unique stage in life – They must make a 
host of decisions in new domains that will affect their health for the rest of their lives. 
Choosing whether to smoke, engage in substance abuse, or eat poorly, for instance, can 
have both immediate and long-term consequences. For example, alcohol abuse is 
associated with risky driving behavior and alcoholism in adulthood. Unhealthy habits 
established in adolescence and young adulthood may last a lifetime (Pratt & Tsitsika, 
2007). While it is true that most teenage drinkers do not become alcoholics, nearly all 
alcoholics began drinking in adolescence (Bonnie & O’Connell, 2004). An especially 
important domain of decision making that opens in adolescence and young adulthood is 
sex. The decisions regarding where, when, and how to engage in sexual behavior are not 
trivial as evidenced by the toll those decisions take on the young adult and society.  
Deleterious consequences of unsafe sexual behavior include unwanted pregnancy 
and sexually transmitted infections (STIs), some of which are life threatening (Maynard, 
1997). In the United States each year, almost 1 million teenagers become pregnant 
(Henshaw, 1998). It is estimated that half of all sexually active youth will contract an STI 
by age 25 (“Sexual Health,” 2006). Furthermore, young adults (ages 15-24) are infected 
with the deadliest STI, HIV, at alarming rates; they account for 40% of new HIV 
infections each year in those over age 15 (“2006 Survey,” 2006). Risky sexual behavior 
also takes a further toll on the economy. STIs carry a severe economic burden. In 2000, 
for example, the cost of newly diagnosed STIs in young adults (ages 15-24) alone was 
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Given the severe health and economic ramifications of unsafe sex, prevention is 
of utmost importance. If unhealthy behaviors can be prevented before habits are 
established, it will be better for both adolescents and society (Reyna & Farley, 2006). To 
understand the best ways to implement interventions geared at prevention, it is highly 
important to study the decision making processes that facilitate risk behavior.   
Traditional Theories of Decision Making  
Traditional theories of decision making include the theory of planned behavior, 
the health belief model, and the theory of reasoned action. They are labeled as traditional 
because they assume the traditional kind of rational decision making process - one that is 
logically coherent and directed at reaching personal goals (Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
Logical coherence is equated with internal consistency. Thus, either risk-seeking or risk-
avoidance can be rational as long as the process is coherent (Reyna & Farley, 2006).   
The behavioral decision making perspective, for example, proposes that rational 
decision makers consider their options, assess probabilities, and weigh potential 
consequences and benefits. The evaluations are then integrated to make a final choice 
(Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1990). The theory of planned behavior and the health belief 
model take on similar perspectives, but expand on it to include detailed mechanisms of 
the decision making process and its implications (Greenberg, Kusche, Cook, & Quamma, 
1995). Overall, these traditional models emphasize the importance of computational and 
deliberative thinking. Mentally estimating expected values and acting accordingly is 
expected to constitute the most rational approach to problem solving (Sheppard, 
Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1998).   
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Framing effects are phenomena that violate the traditional kind of rational 
decision making process. Framing effects occur when decision makers give different 
responses to two objectively identical decisions depending upon whether the decision is 
described in terms of gains or in terms of losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The 
simplest example of a framing effect can be observed in a supermarket. Customers are 
much more likely to purchase chicken labeled “90% lean” than “10% fat,” although both 
labels represent the same fat content.  
A familiar problem-solving task that yields framing effects is the Asian Disease 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the task, subjects must make choices between 
sure options and gambles when options are phrases as gains and as losses. Subjects are 
told to imagine themselves as public health officials; a new disease has infected 600 
people. As public health officials, subjects must deal with the outbreak by choosing 
Program A or Program B. Those subjects who are presented with the task in the gain 
frame are told that if they opt for Program A, 200 lives will be saved for sure. If they 
select program B, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 lives will be saved, but a 2/3 chance that 
no lives will be saved. Alternatively, subjects could be presented with the task in the loss 
frame. In this case, they are told that if they choose Program A, 400 lives will be lost for 
sure. If they opt for Program B, there is a 1/3 chance that no lives will be lost, but a 2/3 
chance that 600 lives will be lost. In both frames, Program A and Program B have 
identical expected outcomes: 400 people will die from the disease and 200 will survive.   
Traditional theorists predict that subjects would choose the same option in both 
frames because the outcomes are the same. It has been found, however, that most people 
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frame, most people choose Program B (the risky option). A multitude of subsequently 
developed tasks have replicated this finding, including ones that use a within-subjects 
design, showing that the same people will change their preference during the course of 
one study (DeMartino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Kuhberger, 1998). Risk 
aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses has come to be known as the standard 
framing effect.       
Fuzzy-Trace Theory  
While many traditional theories treat framing effects as cognitive illusions, 
current dual-process theories take a different approach. As explained above, traditional 
theories emphasize the importance of logical coherence in rational decision making. 
Dual-process theories, however, which include the prototype/willingness model and 
fuzzy-trace theory, propose that decision making is often biased (Gerrard, Gibbons, 
Stock, Lune, & Cleveland, 2005; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Fuzzy-trace theory, in 
particular, has been able to explain a number of findings that traditional theories could 
not.   
Fuzzy-trace theory’s assumptions and predictions are rooted in research on 
memory, judgment and decision making. Its basic tenet is that people encode multiple, 
mental representations of their experience ranging from precise, verbatim representations 
to fuzzy, gist representations. Verbatim memories are quantitative and incorporate 
surface details such as the exact wording, for example, of a risk communication label 
(Reyna & Adam, 2003), while gist memories are qualitative and preserve the overall 
meaning of an experience (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Gist and verbatim traces are 
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In solving reasoning problems, people can use representations from any point on a 
verbatim to gist continuum. Research has shown, however, that adults mainly rely on the 
simplest, least precise level of processing, closest to the fuzzy-gist end of the continuum 
(Reyna, 2004). A conclusion that emerges from fuzzy-trace theory is that framing effects 
are due to gist-based thinking about reasoning problems. In the Asian disease problem, 
the precise numbers are translated into fuzzier representations. In the gain frame, saving 
200 people or taking a 1/3 chance to save 600 and a 2/3 chance to save 0 is translated into 
saving some for sure or chancing saving some or saving none. In adults, fuzzy evaluation 
of the options, saving some is seen as better than saving none, so the sure option is 
preferred. In the loss frame, losing 400 people or taking a 1/3 chance to lose 0 and a 2/3 
chance to lose 600 is translated into losing some for sure or chancing losing none or all. 
A qualitative evaluation of the options leads decision makers to realize that nobody dying 
is better than some dying, so the risky option is preferred (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991).   
An important assumption of fuzzy-trace theory is that intuitive, gist-based 
thinking is often more advanced than precise, analytical thinking (Reyna, 1996). This is 
in contrast to traditional theories that assign highest priority to computational thinking. 
Support for fuzzy-trace theory’s claim has come in the form of a range of experimental 
evidence. For example, research on cardiac risk has demonstrated that more expert 
physicians (who in the end make objectively better decisions) use a quicker and more 
qualitative form of decision making than novice physicians to triage patients (Reyna & 
Lloyd, 2006).  
Development and Decision Making  
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also been supported with evidence from developmental studies of decision making. Since 
intuitive thinking is assumed to be the advanced form of thinking, fuzzy-trace theory 
stipulates that with development, decision making becomes more gist-based and less 
verbatim-based (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Hence, children are actually assumed to be 
the quantitative, logical problem-solvers while adults are the qualitative, simple thinkers. 
Again, this stipulation is contrary to traditional theories, which assume the traditional 
Piagetian notion of progression from intuitive towards analytical thinking with 
development (Reyna, 1996).  
Although quite counterintuitive, fuzzy trace theory’s prediction has been 
substantiated with evidence from studies on framing effects. Reyna and Ellis (1994) 
investigated the development of framing effects by studying pre-school aged children, 
second graders, and fifth graders. Using spinners and “super balls,” children were asked 
to play a game called “Pick the One You Want.” All children were presented with two 
blocks of decision making problems. In one block, the nine problems were framed as 
gains and in the other block, the nine problems were framed as losses. For each problem 
in the gain frame, subjects decided between winning or losing (depending on the frame) a 
certain amount of super balls for sure or taking a chance to win or lose many more prizes 
or none at all. In the loss frame, children began with an endowment so the expected 
outcomes of the problems were the same across frames.    
The youngest children (pre-kindergarteners) displayed no framing effects; they 
quantitatively weighed their options and thus, made the same choices across frames. The 
second graders displayed a reverse framing pattern; they were risk seeking for gains, but 
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dimension. Finally, a standard framing pattern began to emerge in the oldest children 
(fifth graders): risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. In addition, overall risk 
taking steadily decreased with age. The overall decrease in risk seeking with age was also 
demonstrated with a study that used a reflection task (Levin & Hart, 2003). Reflection 
tasks are similar to framing tasks, but there is no endowment in the loss frame so the 
expected outcomes are not the same across frames (e.g. an expected value of $5 in the 
gain frame would be -$5 in the loss frame). The salient conclusion drawn from the results 
is that problem solving becomes more intuitive and less analytical with development.   
Laboratory Tasks and the Real World  
The bulk of evidence for a number of theories of decision making has come from 
results of laboratory tasks. Whether these laboratory tasks actually predict real world 
behavior, however, has been a long-debated issue (Reyna & Farley, 2006) with 
inconclusive evidence. For example, there is evidence to show that performance on 
laboratory tasks that involve no serious consequences for performance and no direct 
representations of real-world health decisions does not extrapolate to the real world 
(Reyna & Farley, 2006). Conversely, Parker and Fischoff (2005) found that higher scores 
on a decision making competence task were associated with more intact social 
environments, more constructive cognitive styles, and fewer maladaptive risk behaviors. 
While framing effects have been studied in detail in the lab, no evidence exists yet for 
successful or unsuccessful transfer to the real world.   
Sensation Seeking  
An assortment of personality traits have been studied to elucidate individual 
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more reliable traits in predicting risk taking (Brown, DiCelmente, & Park, 1992; Horvath 
& Zuckerman, 1993). Zuckerman (1994) has defined sensation seeking as "the seeking of 
varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences and the willingness to 
take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience" (p. 27).   
Individual variability exists in the trait, which is essentially a measure of how 
attracted one is to dangerous behaviors. Low sensation seekers are characterized by high 
arousal and increased anxiety responses to dangerous activities. In contrast, high 
sensation seekers are characterized by lower arousal and less anxiety in response to 
dangerous activities. Lissek and his colleagues (2005) suggest that the low sensation 
seekers’ anxious reactivity makes them avoid risk to avoid the uncontrolled 
accompanying discomfort. Similary, high sensation seekers’ lack of fear leads them to 
take risks because they are less impacted by potential danger. In addition, risk taking 
satisfies high sensation seekers’ desire for novel and intense experiences (Arnett, 1996).  
Sensation seeking is generally measured using Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking 
Scale (Zuckerman, 1971). The personality test consists of a series of forced-choice items 
divided into four subscales: Thrill and Adventure Seeking, Experience Seeking, Boredom 
Susceptibility, and Disinhibition. Each subscale represents a different dimension of 
sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979).  
Sensation seeking has been related to risk taking in a variety of domains. It has 
been found to be the personality trait most highly predictive of early drug use 
(Zuckerman, 1994). In addition, there has been consistent evidence for a relationship 
between sensation seeking and sexual risk taking: number of partners, unprotected sex, 
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research also points to a developmental pattern in sensation seeking; it peaks in 
adolescence and declines in adulthood (Arnett, 1992).  
Present Study  
The current study explores decision making under risk in young adults on a 
process level and investigates the relationship between laboratory task performance and 
real world risk perceptions and behaviors. It employed the theoretical framework of 
fuzzy-trace theory to design the methodology and formulate predictions. The first 
purpose was studied using a within-subjects framing task (all subjects made choices 
under both gain and loss frames) involving hypothetical money. The task allowed us to 
analyze how factors such as risk, magnitude, and wording of information influenced 
preference for safe or risky options. The second aim was studied by relating performance 
on the framing task to a series of measures related to sexual risk taking. This purpose is 
especially significant because little to no research has connected laboratory framing 
effects to risky decisions in the real world; thus, this research seeks to fill an important 
gap in the literature.  
As was previously explained, fuzzy-trace theory proposes that framing effects 
result from making decisions based on the gist of the information presented. In addition, 
fuzzy-trace postulates that gist-based thinking is more advanced than computational 
thinking. Furthermore, the theory assumes that intuitive processing favors risk avoidance 
while quantitative processing more often favors risk taking. With those tenets taken 
together, we hypothesized that those individuals who would be more susceptible to 
framing effects would demonstrate more gist-based thinking about risk (since framing 
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(since gist-based processing favors risk avoidance).   
Previous research linking sensation seeking to risky decision making also 
motivated us to consider this personality trait. Since high and low sensation seekers have 
been shown to have different propensities toward risk taking, we predicted that sensation 
seeking would be related to both framing task performance and real world risky 
decisions. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals who were lower sensation 
seekers would be more risk averse in the decision making task and be less likely to 
engage in unhealthy sexual activities.     
Methods  
Participants.  One hundred and two (79 female and 23 male) Cornell University 
undergraduates participated in the study. They ranged in age from 18 to 22 years (M = 
19.7, SD = 0.92). The sample was 58% European descent, 30% Asian, 7% Hispanic, and 
5% mixed ethnicity. Participants were recruited through announcements in lecture 
courses and through “SUSAN,” an online database that allowed students to sign up for 
experiments electronically. All participants were compensated with extra credit in select 
Psychology or Human Development courses. The study was conducted with approval by 
Cornell University’s Institutional Review Board, Protocol: 06-11-040.   
Materials.    
Decision Making Task. The methodology used was adapted from Reyna and Ellis 
(1994). Several modifications were made for the current study. First, fake money was 
used as the hypothetical prize instead of “superballs.” In addition, all magnitude levels 
were multiplied by five. The expected outcomes of the framing problems in Reyna and 
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Two types of spinners were used. Both types were 18 inches in diameter and were 
made of oak tag. The first type (Spinner A) represented the sure option. There was one 
Spinner A and it was painted completely red. The second type (Spinner B) represented 
the gamble. There were 3 “Spinner Bs,” each with different proportions painted red and 
blue (½ red, ½ blue; ⅓ red, ⅔ blue; ¼ red, ¾ blue). Pictures of sample spinners are 
included in the appendix (see Appendix A).   
Fake money was used to demonstrate the possible outcomes. The fake money was 
the same size and had the same features as real money. Only $5 bills were used. They 
were shown to participants individually or packed together in groups of $20s, $50s, or 
$100s, with the bills fanned out so each one was visible.  
Participants were also given a confidence scale to indicate how they felt about 
each choice. The scale was numbered 1 (most confident) through 7 (least confident), with 
corresponding “smiley faces” (see Appendix B).      
Measures.   
Gist Scales: These were used to analyze each participant’s level of gist-based 
(fuzzy, qualitative) thinking about risky behaviors. The first scale was the Categorical 
Risk scale, which included nine items that measured categorical thinking about risk (e.g., 
“If you keep having unprotected sex, risk adds up and you WILL get a sexually 
transmitted disease”). Each item was rated on a five-point Likert-type scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree (α = .71). The second scale was the Gist Principles scale, 
which contained fifteen principles (e.g., “I have a responsibility to my partner to not put 
him/her at risk”) that could be endorsed or not. Participants checked off the principles 
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and fourth gist measures were the Global Benefits scale and the Global Risks scale. Each 
scale consisted off one item that asked participants to rate the overall benefits (global 
benefits) or risks (global risks) of having sex for them personally. The values ranged 
from 0-3 (none, low, medium, or high). All gist scales with the exception of Global 
Benefits have been previously used (Mills, Reyna, and Estrada, in press).  
Verbatim Scales: These were used to trigger verbatim memories of prior 
behaviors and thus, to tap into a verbatim (precise, quantitative) mode of processing. The 
first scale was a Perceived Personal Risk scale, which consisted of five items that asked 
participants to rate their likelihood of experiencing specific, concrete consequences of 
sexual behavior (e.g., “I am likely to have an STD in the next 6 months”). Each item was 
rated on a five-point Likert-type scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = .81). 
The second verbatim measure was the Quantitative Risk Perception scale, which simply 
asked participants to estimate their probability of having a sexually transmitted disease on 
a scale from 0-100. Both verbatim scales were used in Mills, Reyna, and Estrada (in 
press).  
Outcome Measures: Two scales and a series of additional questions were included 
in the survey to assess outcomes. The first scale was the Intentions to Have Sex scale 
(Mills et al, in press), which contained three items pertaining to future anticipated sexual 
behavior (e.g., Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) before you are in a 
serious relationship or in love?) Responses were given in a Likert-type format, with five 
values ranging from very unlikely to very likely. The second scale was the Intentions to 
Use Birth Control scale (Mills et al, in press), which included five items pertaining to 
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control when you have sex?). Again, responses were given in a Likert-type format, with 
five values ranging from very unlikely to very likely. In addition to the scales, 
participants answered questions about their sexual history. They responded yes or no to 
questions about engaging in vaginal, oral, and anal sex. They were asked for their total 
number of partners, age at first intercourse, and history of STD treatment.   
Additional Scales: Participants also completed three additional scales that have 
been shown to be related to risky behaviors: the Sensation Seeking scale, Behavioral 
Activation scale (BAS), and Behavioral Inhibition scale (BIS). Responses to items on all 
three scales were given in a Likert-type format, with five values ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. The Sensation Seeking scale consisted of eight items with 
prompts such as “I would like to explore strange places” (Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, 
Lorch, & Donohew, 2002). The BAS contained thirteen items, including “I often act on 
the spur of the moment” and “I go out of my way to get things I want” (Carver & White, 
1994). Finally, the seven-item BIS contained prompts such as “I feel worried when I 
think I have done poorly at something” (Carver & White, 1994).  
Procedure.  The experiment had two parts: the decision making task and the 
participant survey. In the first part of the experiment, the decision making task, 
participants were seated in a quiet room at a table across from the experimenter. 
Participants were informed that they would be making a series of choices involving 
winning or losing hypothetical money. Then they were given several additional 
instructions: 1) to make their choices as if this were real life and they actually had the 
chance to win or lose this money 2) that there were no right or wrong answers 3) they 
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The decision making task consisted of two blocks, each with nine problems. In 
one block, the gain-frame problems, participants were “winning” hypothetical money. In 
the other block, the loss-frame problems, participants were “losing” hypothetical money. 
The order of presentation of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. Within each 
block, the nine problems were randomized and thus, were presented in a different order to 
each subject. Three levels of risk were combined (½, ⅓, or ¼ chance to win something or 
in the loss frame, lose nothing) three levels of magnitude (corresponding to expected 
values of $5, $20, or $150) to construct nine problems, all of which were presented in 
both frames (see Appendix C).  
In each trial, participants were shown Spinner A (completely red) and one of the 
Spinner Bs (part red, part blue). In the gain frame trials, participants were asked to choose 
between Spinner A, which allowed them to win a certain amount of money for sure and 
Spinner B, which allowed them to win a greater sum of money if the spinner landed on 
red, but no money if the spinner landed on blue. The fake money was placed on the 
spinners to demonstrate the potential wins. After each trial, participants rated their 
confidence on the 1-7 “smiley face” scale. This procedure was identical in the loss frame, 
except that participants began with an “endowment” of money, from which they could 
lose a certain amount for sure (by choosing Spinner A) or take a chance to lose nothing or 
lose everything (by choosing Spinner B). Exact wording of problems is included in the 
Appendix (see Appendix D). Participants were not allowed to actually spin the spinners in 
order to prevent those outcomes from influencing future choices. In both frames, the 
expected values of the sure option and the gamble were identical. Furthermore, the 
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of the decision making task, participants were debriefed. They were asked what they 
were thinking about when making the choices and whether they noticed a difference 
between the gain and loss frames.       
After the decision making task, all participants were given a series of self-
administered questionnaires to complete. The survey packet included a demographic 
questionnaire, four gist scales, two verbatim scales, a series of outcome measures, and 
three additional scales shown to be related to risky behaviors (see Appendix C).  
Participants were left alone in the room to give them privacy. An experimenter 
waited nearby in case questions arose. Participants were assured that all answers would 
remain confidential and there would be no way to link their name to their responses. 
Students were free to leave once they completed the packet. The entire experiment took 
30-35 minutes to complete.   
Results  
 The first set of analyses examined group effects. A 2 (Sex) x 2 (Order of Blocks) 
x 2 (Frame) x 3 (Level of Risk) x 3 (Outcome Magnitude) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted (See Appendix F) on the choices participants made (whether they chose 
the sure option or the gamble). Sex and order were between-subjects variables; frame, 
level of risk, and outcome magnitude were within-subjects variables. Most importantly, 
this analysis revealed a main effect of frame, F(1,98) = 6.07, p<.05. Participants chose 
the gamble 57.9% (SE = 2.6%) of the time in the gain frame and 65.8% (SE = 2.6%) of 
the time in the loss frame, resembling a standard framing pattern (Figure 1).    
There were also significant main effects of risk, F(2,98) = 7.58, p<.001, and 
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(regardless of frame), participants showed a monotonic decrease in preference for the 
gamble (Figure 2). Similarly, as the magnitude of the expected outcome increased, 
participants were less likely to take the gamble. However, this was not a monotonic 
decrease (Figure 3). Participants strongly preferred the gamble at the low (M=.749, 
SE=.030) and medium magnitudes (M=.647, SE=.029), but preferred the sure option at 
the high magnitudes (M=.450, SE=.031). In addition, frame interacted with magnitude, 
F(2,98)=3.02, p<.05 (Figure 4). There was a monotonic decrease in preference for the 
risky option with increasing magnitude in the gain frame. In contrast, in the loss frame, 
there was only a slight decrease in gambling from the lowest to middle magnitudes, but a 
stark decrease in gambling from the middle to highest magnitudes.    
After the frame by magnitude interaction was revealed, t-tests were run to 
compare gambling in the two frames at each level of magnitude (see Appendix F). There 
was a significant effect of frame for the medium magnitude, t(101) = -2.40, p < .05. 
However, the effect of frame was not significant for the low [t(101) = -1.194, p=0.235] or 
high magnitudes [t(101) = 0.339, p =0.735].  
 The two between-subjects factors (sex and order) were significant in the choice 
analysis. Frame interacted with both sex [F(1,98) = 3.82, p<.05] and the order in which 
the blocks were presented [F(1,98) = 4.16, p<.05]. Males overall chose the gamble (M 
=.660, SE=.036) more often than females did (M=.557, SE=.020); however, the 
interaction reveals that both sexes gambled equally in the gain frame, but males gambled 
more than females in the loss frame (Figure 5). Hence, males showed stronger framing 
effects than females (larger difference between choices across frames). Participants who 
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often than those who were presented with the loss frame first; thus, they displayed 
stronger framing effects (Figure 6).   
The second set of analyses examined individual differences by relating 
performance on the laboratory task to survey items (Table 1). Individual framing scores 
were computed by subtracting the proportion of times individuals gambled in the gain 
from the proportion of times individuals gambled in the loss frame (Framing Score = 
[proportion gamble in loss] – [proportion gamble in gain]). Hence, each participant 
received a framing score on a continuous scale from -1 to +1. Positive scores 
corresponded to a standard framing pattern (more risk seeking for losses than for gains). 
Negative scores corresponded to a reverse framing pattern (more risk seeking for gains 
than losses). More positive or more negative scores represented a greater susceptibility to 
standard framing or to reverse framing, respectively. For example, a score of -1 
represented complete reverse framing: gambling 100% of the time in the gain frame and 
0% of the time in the loss frame. Finally, a score of 0 signified no framing effect 
(consistency across frames).  
The first individual differences analysis related individual framing scores and 
overall gambling behavior to outcome measures. Individual framing scores correlated 
negatively with total number of sexual partners, r(93) = -.278, p<.01. Since negative 
framing scores represent a reverse framing pattern, this correlation suggests that reverse 
framers are the most sexually active. Conversely, standard framers are the least active. In 
addition, overall gambling behavior (proportion of times individuals chose the gamble 
regardless of frame) correlated negatively with Intentions to Use Birth Control, r(89) = -
Framing in Young Adults 19.210, p<.05. Hence, individuals who were more risk seeking in the laboratory task were 
more risk seeking in real world sexual behavior (less likely to use prophylaxis).  
The next individual differences analysis related the gist scales to outcome 
measures. The four gist scales were all significantly correlated with each other, showing 
that they were indeed measuring a related construct. The three scales in which higher 
scores were more protective (encouraged risk avoidance) were correlated positively- 
categorical thinking and gist principle endorsement, r(98) = .426, p<.001; gist principle 
endorsement and global risk perception, r(101) = .402, p<.001. For the global benefits 
scale, higher scores were less protective (encouraged risk seeking) and thus, this scale 
was negatively correlated with categorical thinking [r(96) = -.261, p<.01], gist principle 
endorsement [r(99) = -.446, p<.001], and global risk perception [r(99) = -.422, p<.001].  
Two of the gist-based measurements correlated negatively with total number of 
sexual partners: gist principle endorsement [r(93) = -.247, p<.05] and categorical 
thinking [r(90) = -.234, p<.05]. Participants who endorsed many gist principles and 
thought about risk categorically were less likely to be sexually active. In addition, 
abstinence correlated with scores on all of the gist scales. Abstinent individuals 
demonstrated stronger categorical thinking [r(94) = .223, p<.05], endorsed more gist 
principles [r(97) = .326, p<.01], rated the global risks of sex as higher [r(97) = .293, 
p<.01], and rated the global benefits of sex as lower [r(95) = -.420, p<.001] than sexually 
active individuals.  
Outcome measures were then related to the verbatim scales. The two verbatim 
measurements, quantitative risk estimate and perceived personal risk, correlated 
positively [r(95) = .224, p<.05], demonstrating that the scales measured related 
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partners, r(93) = .303, p<.01, showing a reflective relationship; individuals who were 
more sexually active rated their specific risk of having an STD as higher. Additionally, 
perceived personal risk correlated positively with intentions to have sex [r(92) = .217, 
p<.05], illustrating another reflective relationship; individuals who were sexually active 
perceived a greater personal risk of contracting an STD or becoming pregnant.  
In the final analysis, the additional behavioral scales were related to performance 
on the decision making task, gist scales, and outcome measures. Sensation seeking 
correlated positively with gambling in the gain frame [r(88) = .216, p<.05], but did not 
correlate with gambling in the loss frame. Hence, high sensation seekers were more likely 
to be risk seeking for gains, but their risk preference did not differ from low sensation 
seekers for losses. Sensation seeking was also related to two of the gist-based measures: 
It correlated negatively with categorical thinking [r(86) = -.293, p<.01] and positively 
with global benefit perception [r(96) = .232, p<.05]. Thus, high sensation seekers were 
less likely to think about risk categorically and rated the benefits of sex as higher.   
In terms of outcome measures, sensation seeking did not significantly correlate 
with sexual activity, but it did correlate negatively with intentions to use birth control, 
r(85) = -.259, p<.05. Neither the Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS) nor the Behavioral 
Activation Scale (BAS) significantly correlated with laboratory task performance or 
outcome measures. However, both correlated with global benefit perception- the BIS 
negatively [r(97) = -.210, p<.05] and the BAS positively [r(96) = .284, p<.01].  
Discussion  
The first purpose of the current study was to explore decision making under risk 
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Results of the task partially support fuzzy-trace theory’s prediction that adults use an 
intuitive, non-computational form of processing to make decisions under risk. Qualitative 
processing was evidenced by a change in risk preference across gain and loss frames, 
even when choices represented identical levels of risk, magnitude and expected values (a 
framing effect). Cornell undergraduates demonstrated a standard framing effect across all 
levels of risk but only at the medium magnitude level. At a medium magnitude level, in 
which all problems had expected outcomes of $20, participants were more risk seeking 
for losses than for gains. Although participants exhibited more risk seeking behavior in 
the loss frame than in the gain frame for the lowest and highest magnitude levels, which 
had expected outcomes of $5 and $150 respectively, the difference in degree of risk 
aversion was not significant.   
A possible explanation is that the magnitude levels were inappropriate for the 
task. The lowest magnitude may have been so low that participants did not care about 
risking the small amount. As a result, they were tempted to choose the gamble regardless 
of frame. Similarly, the highest magnitude may have been too high deterring participants 
from taking risks with a large sum. Consequently, they preferred the sure option 
regardless of frame.  This explanation, however, is not well supported by the data as 
participants did not show floor or ceiling effects for either magnitude level. For example, 
at the highest magnitude, participants were still gambling over 40% of the time.  
Another purely speculative explanation is that the medium magnitude level 
prompted undergraduates to think more intuitively about the task, whereas the other 
magnitude levels pushed undergraduates to think more analytically about the task. 
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a real value in that most students probably know what they can purchase with it. One 
hundred and fifty dollars is a significant sum, but many students do not deal with such a 
large amount of money on a regular basis. They are not as familiar with transactions 
involving $150 or its multiples. Students are likely familiar with $5, but it does not have 
as significant a value as $20. Few significant transactions involve $5 or its multiples. 
Since the medium magnitude level is the only one in which the monetary amount had 
both familiar and therefore real value to participants, it may have been most meaningful.  
Familiarity, as a function of experience, has been shown to increase a person’s 
tendency to process information intuitively (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). According to fuzzy-
trace theory, intuitive processing involves applying the meaning or gist of a situation in 
order to reach a decision. In addition, fuzzy-trace theory stipulates that intuitive 
processing leads to framing effects. Hence, the fact that the $20 may have represented a 
qualitative experience as opposed to a quantitative number to participants, likely 
encouraged them to consider the problems presented in a predominantly gist-based way. 
Conversely, $5 and $150 may have been merely numbers to participants, inducing them 
to process those problems quantitatively. This quantitative decision-making is reflected in 
the participants’ avoidance of framing effects at those magnitudes. Further research that 
examines undergraduate participants’ responses to framing problems at magnitudes 
between the lowest and highest levels used in this study may be able to lend support or 
refute the aforementioned explanation.  
In addition to elucidating framing effects at different magnitudes, the frame by 
magnitude interaction illustrates an interesting pattern (Figure 4). As opposed to in the 
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participants to take the gamble between the low and medium magnitudes. There was a 
much steeper decrease in probability of participants accepting the gamble between the 
high and medium magnitudes than between the low and medium magnitudes. When the 
data from each frame is considered separately, the trends in the gain and loss frames 
suggest categorical thinking about risk. As the stakes increased, participants began to take 
the sure option more often. Combined, the trends in the gain and loss frames imply that 
the magnitudes served as distinct categories when decisions are framed positively or 
negatively. Hence a magnitude of $20 has a different utility in the gain frame than in the 
loss frame.   
While a framing effect was apparent for at least one magnitude level, it was not 
entirely standard. A standard framing effect implies risk aversion for losses and risk 
seeking for gains. In this task, participants were actually risk seeking for both frames, but 
they preferred the risky option more in the loss frame. This may be due to the task or it 
may be due to the age group. If the magnitude and risk levels were greater, participants 
may have been more risk averse. In addition, the task used hypothetical money and there 
were no real consequences, which may have lead students to view the gamble as less of a 
risk than it actually was. From a developmental standpoint, research has shown that risk 
taking decreases in the period from childhood to adolescence to adulthood (Levin & Hart, 
2003). The young adults in this study may be larger risk takers than their older 
counterparts. To distinguish among these explanations, further research should compare 
young adults’ performance on this task with adolescents and middle-aged adults.     
 Several unexpected results were also found in the decision making task. A frame 
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framing effects than females. Previous studies that have examined sex differences in 
framing effects have yielded inconsistent results (Fagley & Miller, 1996; McElroy & 
Setta, 2003). Furthermore, this finding cannot be supported or refuted with the theoretical 
framework of the current study. It is possible that the result is due to the unequal 
representation of male and female participants; there were three times as many females as 
males.  
The other unexpected result was a frame by order interaction. The order of 
presentation of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects and not expected to affect 
their choices. Participants who were presented with the gain frame problems first showed 
stronger framing effects than those who were presented with the loss frame problems 
first. A speculative explanation is that the loss frame acted as a mild negative mood 
induction. When asked an open ended question about what they were thinking about 
while making the choices, many participants reported being upset in the loss frame. They 
did not like that their money was being taken away from them and were distressed about 
trying to hold onto it. However, participants did not report being elated in the gain frame 
when they were winning money. So it is plausible that the loss frame induced a negative 
mood while the gain frame was neutral. Being in a negative mood throughout the whole 
task (when the loss frame was given first) may have prompted participants to engage in 
more item-level processing, an explanation which has been suggested in the literature 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Item-level processing, as opposed to gist-based processing, 
would make participants less susceptible to framing effects (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). 
Further research should be done specifically on emotion and framing effects to help 
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The second purpose of the current study was to explore the relationship between 
laboratory task performance and real world risk perceptions and behaviors. This was 
accomplished by relating laboratory task performance to survey items. Our first a priori 
hypothesis predicted that individuals who show stronger framing effects will show more 
gist-based thinking about risk and will engage in fewer unhealthy behaviors. This was 
somewhat supported by the data. Individual differences in susceptibility to framing 
effects correlated with total number of sexual partners. Specifically, standard framers 
were the least sexually active followed by non-framers. Finally, reverse framers were the 
most sexually active.   
One possible explanation involves rationality. It is assumed that individuals who 
are more “rational” will engage in fewer risky behaviors; however, different theories 
have different views of what is rational (see introduction for details). According to 
traditional theories (e.g. theory of reasoned action, health belief model), non-framers are 
the rational thinkers because their choices are quantitative, and thus logically coherent. 
Alternatively, fuzzy-trace theory postulates that standard framers are the most rational 
because they use gist-based processing, the most advanced form of thinking. Gist-based 
processing simultaneously leads to risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. 
However, there are no process level theories that can explain that reverse framing is 
rational. Hence, a thought process that cannot be deemed “rational” may make it more 
difficult for individuals to avoid risk.  
The connection between reverse framing and sexual activity likely has to do with 
a focus on outcomes. In Reyna and Ellis (1994), the study in which the current one is 
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explained that the effect resulted from an exclusive focus on the outcome dimension. 
Basing decisions on outcome differences leads individuals to take the gamble in the gain 
frame because it offers the prospect of winning more, compared with the sure option; but 
it leads individuals to take the sure option in the loss frame because it offers the prospect 
of losing less, compared with the gamble. Hence, if reverse framers view sex as a gain, 
they are more likely to take the risks and have a greater number of sexual partners.   
The sexual activity outcome measure also correlated negatively with scores on 
two of the gist-based scales: categorical thinking and gist principles. Thus, individuals 
who were more gist-based thinkers had fewer sexual partners. This supports fuzzy-trace 
theory’s prediction that gist-based thinking is protective (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). 
Additionally, abstinent individuals scored higher on all four gist-based scales than 
sexually active individuals. Since abstinence involves the least risk, this finding further 
supports the notion that gist-based thinking is protective.   
Interestingly, sexual activity correlated positively with one of the verbatim scales, 
quantitative risk perception, which demonstrates a reflective relationship. Young adults 
engaging in riskier sexual behaviors realized that their chance of having an STD was 
greater than that of their less active peers. Total number of partners did not relate to the 
other verbatim scale, perceived personal risk, however, that was likely due to the floor 
effect observed. For the scale, participants rated their likelihood of experiencing specific, 
concrete consequences of risky sexual behavior on a scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. The majority of the participants responded with strongly disagree for all 
five items and no one answered neutral, agree, or strongly agree for any item. Hence, 
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The second a priori hypothesis predicted that individuals who were less risk 
seeking in the task would score lower on sensation seeking, and be less likely to engage 
in risky behaviors. This hypothesis was mostly supported by the data. Participants who 
gambled more in the task (regardless of frame) reported having fewer intentions to use 
birth control. Risk seeking was thus related to a real world risky intention. Overall 
gambling did not correlate with sensation seeking scores; however, gambling in the gain 
frame did. Thus, low sensation seekers were less likely to take risks in the gain frame, but 
their preference did not significantly differ from high sensation seekers in the loss frame. 
This makes sense because gambling in the loss frame is normal for advanced thinkers 
(according to fuzzy-trace theory). Gambling in the gain frame, however, is not. So we 
observe that high sensation seeking is leading individuals to deviate from a standard 
framing pattern; they are not risk averse for gains.   
Interestingly, high sensation seekers were also found to be less gist-based thinkers 
and take more real world risks (fewer intentions to use birth control). They also rated the 
global benefits of sex as higher. Taken together, perhaps the thrill of risky behaviors 
interferes with the retrieval of gist representations to make healthy decisions. In addition, 
these findings could be interpreted from a developmental perspective. After peaking in 
adolescence, sensation seeking decreases with age (Arnett, 1992). The decline in 
sensation seeking, therefore, may contribute to the developmental increase in gist-based 
processing. This speculation could be studied further with developmental studies.   
 In drawing conclusions from the results, the homogeneity of the population must 
be addressed. All participants were undergraduate students at a top research university. 
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graduated from a four-year college. The homogeneous makeup of subjects was both a 
strength and a weakness. There were few demographic or contextual factors that could 
have influenced the results, which strengthened the validity of the explanations. It is, 
however, difficult to generalize the findings to the entire United States young adult 
population.   
Overall, both of the study’s original purposes were effectively explored. The most 
salient findings demonstrate that laboratory task performance is related to real world risk 
perceptions and behaviors. This result has significant implications for future research. 
Laboratory tasks can be controlled and manipulated unlike real world observations. Our 
study’s results support that a financial framing task sufficiently predicts real world 
behavior. Therefore, this task can be used in future studies to investigate specific 
processes and factors (e.g. affect) that influence risky decisions. The other prominent 
findings support the notion that gist-based thinking is protective. Individuals who scored 
higher on the gist-based scales were less likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors. These 
findings suggest the potential of preventative interventions focused on gist-based thinking 
in adolescents and young adults. If young people were trained to think in more gist-like 
ways, it is possible that they would take fewer risks in the future; thus, a gist-guiding 
intervention could be an effective prevention strategy.   
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    1            2             3            4             5           6            7  
 





   Male 
   Female 
 
2.) How old are you? _________________________ 
 
3.) What is your birth date? (e.g. 04/20/86) ________________________ 
 
4.) Where are you from?  
  City:  ________________________ 
 State:  ________________________ 
 
5.) What year are you in school (or what year did you complete in Spring 2007)? 
   Freshman – high school 
   Sophomore – high school 
   Junior – high school 
   Senior – high school 
   Freshman - college 
   Sophomore – college  
   Junior – college  
   Senior – college  
   1st year graduate school 
   2nd year graduate school 
   3rd year graduate school 
   Other – Please Specify: _____________________ 
 
6.) Are you right or left handed? 
   Right-handed 
   Left-handed 
   Ambidextrous  
 
7.) What race do you consider yourself to be? Select one of the following: 
   Caucasian/White 
   Black or African American 
   Asian 
   Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
   American Indian or Alaskan Native 
   Mixed Race – Please specify: _____________________________________ 
 
8.) What ethnicity do you consider yourself to be? Select one of the following: 
   European descent 
   Mexican/Chicano 
   Other Hispanic: 
   Puerto Rican 
   Cuban 
   Central American 
Framing in Young Adults 37   South American 
   Other - please specify: ___________________________ 
   Native American/Tribe: ____________________________________ 
   Asian-American 
   Chinese 
   Japanese 
   Pacific Islander 
   Filipino 
   Other-please specify: __________________________  
   Mixed ethnicity – please specify (ex. Chicano and Native American): 
__________________________________________ 
 
9.) What is the highest level your father completed in school (check only one) 
   He completed less than 12th grade (less than high school) 
   He graduated from high school 
   He had some college after high school 
   He graduated from a 4 year college or more 
   Don’t know 
 
10.) What is the highest level your mother completed in school (check only one) 
   She completed less than 12th grade (less than high school) 
   She graduated from high school 
   She had some college after high school 
   She graduated from a 4 year college or more 
   Don’t know 
 
Please answer the following two questions only if you are in high school: 
 
11.) Do you receive a free lunch from school? 
   Yes 
   No 
   Don’t know 
 
12.) Do you receive a reduced-price lunch from school? 
   Yes 
   No 
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Here are several statements.  There is no right or wrong answer, we want to know what you think.  Do you agree or 
disagree with the statement?  Please mark the answer that you believe.  The choices are strongly disagree, disagree, 
neither disagree nor agree, agree, and strongly agree.  
 






      
      
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree  Neither 
Disagree 
nor Agree 
Disagree  Strongly 
Agree 
1.  If you keep having unprotected sex, risk 
 adds up and you WILL get pregnant or get  
someone pregnant……………………… … 
______________________________________________________________________________________  $   $   $   $     $  
   
2.  If you can’t handle getting protection, you  
are not ready for sex………………………… 
______________________________________________________________________________________  $   $   $   $     $  
   
3.  When in doubt about having sex, delay  
or avoid it……………………………………. 
______________________________________________________________________________________  $   $   $   $     $  
   
4.  If you keep having unprotected sex, risk  
adds up and you WILL get a sexually transmitted  
disease……………………………………….. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________  $   $   $   $     $  
   








7.  Even low risks happen to someone………. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What About These Reasons…            
$   $   $   $     $  
 
$   $   $   $     $  
 
$   $   $   $     $  
 
 
Please answer all of the following questions whether you have had sex or not. 




8.  Even if you use condoms, eventually you’ll  
get an STD if you have sex enough………… 
  $   $   $   $     $  
 




Disagree  Disagree 
Neither 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
9.  Once you have HIV/AIDS, there is no  
second chance…… … …………………… 
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The Future…           
Please, answer these questions whether or not you have had sex. 
Very 






1. Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) before you turn 




















2. Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) before you are in a 
serious relationship or in love?.......................... 
3. Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) before you are 
finished with high school?......................................... 
4. Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) during the next 
year?........................................................................ 
5. Do you think you will have sex (or have sex again) before you get 
married?....................................................................  $   $   $    $   $  
$   $   $    $   $  
$   $   $    $   $  






The Future…           








1. Do you think you will actually use birth control when you have 




















2. If you were going to have sex, would you prefer to use a 
condom (rubber)?........................................................................  $   $   $    $    $  
3. Do you intend to use birth control when you have sex?..........  $   $   $    $    $  
4. Do you intend to use a condom (rubber) when you have 
sex?...............................................................................................  $   $   $    $    $  
5. Do you think you will actually use a condom (rubber) when 
you have sex?...............................................................................  $   $   $    $    $  
6. If you were going to have sex, would you prefer to use birth 
control?.........................................................................................  $   $   $    $    $  
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Which of the following principles apply to YOUR decision to have sex (check ALL that apply): 
 
  $  Better to not have sex than risk getting HIV/AIDS. 
 
  $  Better to focus on school than have sex. 
 
  $  I have a responsibility to my partner to not put him/her at risk. 
  $  Avoid risk. 
$  Better to be safe than sorry. 
$  Better to not have sex than risk getting pregnant or getting someone pregnant. 
$  Better to wait than to have sex when you are not ready. 
$  I have a responsibility to my parents/family to not have sex. 
$  Better to not have sex than hurt my parents/family. 
$  I have a responsibility to God to wait to have sex. 
$  I have a responsibility to myself to wait to have sex. 
$  Better to have fun (sex) while you can. 
$  Known partners are safe partners. 
$  Having sex is better than losing a relationship. 
$  Having sex is worth risking pregnancy. 
1.) Overall, for YOU which of the following best describes the BENEFITS of having sex? 
$  NONE  $  LOW  $ MEDIUM  $ HIGH  Check one: 
2.) Overall, for YOU which of the following best describes the RISKS of having sex? 
$  NONE  $  LOW  $ MEDIUM  $ HIGH  Check one: 
3.) Which of the following is a better description of YOUR options regarding sex (check ONE)? 
$  Choosing between having more benefits and more risk versus having fewer benefits and less risk. 
$  Choosing between having some benefits with no risk versus taking a risk. 
4.) What are the chances that YOU have a sexually transmitted disease? 
0………10……….20………30………40………50………60………70………80………90………100% 
5.) What is the risk of a teenager getting pregnant or getting someone pregnant if he or she has sex over a one year time 
period (more than once a month) and doesn’t use anything for birth control? 
0………10……….20………30………40………50………60………70………80………90………100% 
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  What do you believe?   
Please answer all of the following questions whether you have had 
sex or not. 
Strongly 




Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
$   $   $    $   $   1. I am likely to have HIV/AIDS by age 25……………… 
2. I am likely to get (a girl) pregnant in next 6 months… 
3. I am likely to have a STD by age 25………………….. 
4. I am likely to have HIV/AIDS in the next 6 months….. 
5. I am likely to have STD in the next 6 months………… 
$   $   $    $   $  
$   $   $    $   $  
$   $   $    $   $  
$   $   $    $   $  





The Really Personal Stuff About You...          
Please read the following questions and think about them carefully.  Remember that your answers are private and will not 
be shown to your parents, teachers or program leaders.  
 
$ Yes  $  No    1. Have you ever had vaginal sex?................................................ 
 
 
$ Yes  $  No    2.  Have you ever had oral sexl?.................................................. 
 
 
$ Yes  $  No   
3. Have you ever anal sex?....................................... 
 
$ Yes  $  No 
 
 
4. Have you had vaginal sex in the last 30 days?.................................................................... 
 













$  Very unlikely 
$  Unlikely 
$  Don’t know 
$  Likely 





7. If you have had sex, how old were you the first time you had sex?   





 I have never had sex









8. If you have had sex, how many total people have you had sex with?  
    
<< 
<< 
Number of female (girl) partners
  
Number of male (boy) partners
  





 I have never had sex
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After each statement, please select which response best reflects your opinion by circling 
one of the following options: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree or strongly agree. 




1.  I would like to explore strange places. 
  
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
2.  I get restless when I spend too much time at home. 
  
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
3.  I like to do frightening things. 
  
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
4.  I like wild parties. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5.  I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned routes or timetables 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
6.  I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
7.  I would like to try bungee jumping 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 





1.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happened I usually get pretty “worked 
up.” 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
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 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
3.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
4.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
6.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
7.  I have very few fears compared to my friends 
 




1.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
2.  When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
3.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
  
4.  It would excite me to win a contest 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
5.  When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
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6.  When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
7.  I go out of my way to get things I want. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
8.  If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
9.  When I go after something I use a “no hold barred” approach 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
10. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
11. I crave excitement and new sensations. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
12. I’m always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
13. I often act on the spur of the moment. 
 
 Strongly  Disagree  Disagree  Neutral         Agree  Strongly Agree 
 
  






















































































You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $5 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win $10, but if the spinner lands on blue, 
you win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $5 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win 
$10, maybe win nothing?  (1/2) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $20 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win $40, if the spinner lands on blue, you 
win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $20 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win 
$40, maybe win nothing? (1/2) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $150 for sure.  If you pick this side, you 
take a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win $300, if the spinner lands on blue, 
you win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $150 for sure, or take a chance and maybe 
win $300, maybe win nothing? (1/2) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $5 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win $15, if the spinner lands on blue, you 
win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $5 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win $15, 
maybe win nothing? (1/3) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $20 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win  $60, if the spinner lands on blue, you 
win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $20 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win 
$60, maybe win nothing? (1/3) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $150 for sure.  If you pick this side, you 
take a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win  $450, if the spinner lands on blue, 
you win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $150 for sure, or take a chance and maybe 
win $450, maybe win nothing? (1/3) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $5 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win  $20, if the spinner lands on blue, you 
win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $5 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win $20, 
maybe win nothing? (1/4) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $20 for sure.  If you pick this side, you take 
a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win  $80, if the spinner lands on blue, you 
win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $20 for sure, or take a chance and maybe win 
$80, maybe win nothing? (1/4) 
 
You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you win $150 for sure.  If you pick this side, you 
take a chance.  If the spinner were to land on red, you win  $600, if the spinner lands on blue, 
you win nothing.  What do you want to do? Win $150 for sure, or take a chance and maybe 
















































































































































































I am going to give you $10.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $5 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $10.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you give me back nothing.  What do you want to do?  (1/2)    
 
 
I am going to give you $40.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $20 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $40.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing.  What do you want to do?  . (1/2)  
 
 
I am going to give you $300.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $150 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $300.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing.  What do you want to do?  (1/2)  
 
 
I am going to give you $15.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $10 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $15.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing.  What do you want to do?  (1/3) 
 
 
I am going to give you $60. You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $40 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $60.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing. What do you want to do? (1/3) 
 
 
I am going to give you $450.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $300 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $450.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing. What do you want to do? (1/3)   
 
 
I am going to give you $20.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $15 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $20.  If the spinner 




I am going to give you $80.  You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $60 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $80.  If the spinner 
lands on red, you lose nothing. What do you want to do? (1/4) 
 
 
I am going to give you $600. You have a choice.  If you pick this side, you lose $450 for sure.  If 
you pick this side, you take a chance.  If the spinner lands on blue, you lose $600.  If the spinner 













































Framing in Young Adults 48Risk and Decision-Making in Adolescents-Cornell Adult Consent  
You are invited to take part in a research study of how young adults make decisions. We 
are asking you to take part because of your age.  Please read this form carefully, ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.  
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn how adults make 
decisions. You must be at least 18 years old and attending Cornell University in order to 
take part in this study.  
What we will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, we will play a game either 
on the computer or on paper, about decision making.  A series of choices will be 
presented in which the number of imaginary prizes will change and the chances of 
winning or losing those prizes will also change.  In addition, you will tell us how 
confident you are with your decisions.  Then you will be asked to fill out a demographic 
survey and a survey about your sexual attitudes and behaviors. You may decline to fill 
out this survey out if you do not feel comfortable. If you decide to complete the survey, 
you may leave any questions blank that you do not feel comfortable answering. The study 
will take less than one hour to complete.  
Risks and benefits: The risks involved with being in this study are no more than you 
might experience during regular daily activities.  There are no direct benefits to you.  
However, you will be helping us learn more about how people make decisions.    
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may 
withdraw from the study at anytime.  If you decide not to take part or to skip some of the 
questions, it will not affect your current or future relationship with Cornell University.    
Framing in Young Adults 49Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. Your 
name will not be linked to your answers.  In any sort of report we make public we will 
not include any information that will make it possible to identify you by a third party. 
Research records will be kept in a locked file for at least three (3) years; only the 
researchers will have access to the records.  Data may be used for educational purposes 
and shown to students, trainees and others anonymously but you will not be identifiable 
by a third party.    
If you have questions: The researcher conducting this study is Regina Myers.  Please 
ask any questions you have now.  If you have questions later, you may contact Regina at 
rmm39@cornell.edu or at 607-254-1504.  You can reach Steven Estrada, Team Leader, 
or Professor Valerie Reyna, Principle Investigator at sme27@cornell.edu or at 607-254-
1172.  If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this 
study, you may contact the University Committee on Human Subjects (UCHS) at 607-
255-5138 or access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm.   
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.  
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to 
any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.  
Your name ___________________________________  
Your Signature ___________________________________ Date _________________   
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Explanation of Variables: 
Frame: 1 = gain, 2 = loss 
Risk: 1 = 1/2, 2 = 1/3, 3 = 1/4 (chance to win gamble) 
Magnitude: 1 = Low (expected value of $5), 2 = Medium (expected value of $20), 3 = High 
(expected value of $150) 
G125/G1220/G12150 = gain frame, ½ chance to win gamble, sure win of $1/5/150 
G135/G1320/G13150 = gain frame, 1/3 chance to win gamble, sure win of $5/20/150 
G145/G1420/G14150 = gain frame, ¼ chance to win gamble, sure win of $5/20/150 
L1210/L1240/L12300 = loss frame, ½ chance to win gamble, initial endowment of $10/40/300 
L1315/L1360/L13450 = loss frame, 1/3 chance to win gamble, initial endowment of $15/60/450 
L1420/L1480/L14600 = loss frame, ¼ chance to win gamble, initial endowment of $20/80/600 
 
 Within-Subjects  Factors 
 
Measure: gamble  
frame  risk  magnitude 
Dependent 
Variable 
1  G125 
2  G1220 
1 
3  G12150 
1  G135 
2  G1320 
2 
3  G13150 
1  G145 
2  G1420 
1 
3 
3  G14150 
1  L1210 
2  L1240 
1 
3  L12300 
1  L1315 
2  L1360 
2 
3  L13450 
1  L1420 
2  L1480 
2 
3 




















frame  Pillai's Trace  .058 6.073(a) 1.000 98.000  .015 .058
   Wilks' Lambda  .942 6.073(a) 1.000 98.000  .015 .058
   Hotelling's Trace  .062 6.073(a) 1.000 98.000  .015 .058
   Roy's Largest Root  .062 6.073(a) 1.000 98.000  .015 .058
frame * Sex  Pillai's Trace  .038 3.824(a) 1.000 98.000  .053 .038
   Wilks' Lambda  .962 3.824(a) 1.000 98.000  .053 .038
   Hotelling's Trace  .039 3.824(a) 1.000 98.000  .053 .038
   Roy's Largest Root  .039 3.824(a) 1.000 98.000  .053 .038
frame * Order  Pillai's Trace  .041 4.155(a) 1.000 98.000  .044 .041
   Wilks' Lambda  .959 4.155(a) 1.000 98.000  .044 .041
   Hotelling's Trace  .042 4.155(a) 1.000 98.000  .044 .041
   Roy's Largest Root  .042 4.155(a) 1.000 98.000  .044 .041
frame * Sex  *  
Order 
Pillai's Trace  .000 .032(a) 1.000 98.000  .859 .000
   Wilks' Lambda  1.000 .032(a) 1.000 98.000  .859 .000
   Hotelling's Trace  .000 .032(a) 1.000 98.000  .859 .000
   Roy's Largest Root  .000 .032(a) 1.000 98.000  .859 .000
risk  Pillai's Trace  .109 5.906(a) 2.000 97.000  .004 .109
   Wilks' Lambda  .891 5.906(a) 2.000 97.000  .004 .109
   Hotelling's Trace  .122 5.906(a) 2.000 97.000  .004 .109
   Roy's Largest Root  .122 5.906(a) 2.000 97.000  .004 .109
risk * Sex  Pillai's Trace  .002 .097(a) 2.000 97.000  .908 .002
   Wilks' Lambda  .998 .097(a) 2.000 97.000  .908 .002
   Hotelling's Trace  .002 .097(a) 2.000 97.000  .908 .002
   Roy's Largest Root  .002 .097(a) 2.000 97.000  .908 .002
risk * Order  Pillai's Trace  .013 .640(a) 2.000 97.000  .530 .013
   Wilks' Lambda  .987 .640(a) 2.000 97.000  .530 .013
   Hotelling's Trace  .013 .640(a) 2.000 97.000  .530 .013
   Roy's Largest Root  .013 .640(a) 2.000 97.000  .530 .013
risk * Sex  *  
Order 
Pillai's Trace  .004 .188(a) 2.000 97.000  .829 .004
   Wilks' Lambda  .996 .188(a) 2.000 97.000  .829 .004
   Hotelling's Trace  .004 .188(a) 2.000 97.000  .829 .004
   Roy's Largest Root  .004 .188(a) 2.000 97.000  .829 .004
magnitude  Pillai's Trace  .315 22.285(a) 2.000 97.000  .000 .315
   Wilks' Lambda  .685 22.285(a) 2.000 97.000  .000 .315
   Hotelling's Trace  .459 22.285(a) 2.000 97.000  .000 .315
   Roy's Largest Root  .459 22.285(a) 2.000 97.000  .000 .315
magnitude * 
Sex 
Pillai's Trace  .005 .252(a) 2.000 97.000  .778 .005
   Wilks' Lambda  .995 .252(a) 2.000 97.000  .778 .005
   Hotelling's Trace  .005 .252(a) 2.000 97.000  .778 .005
   Roy's Largest Root  .005 .252(a) 2.000 97.000  .778 .005
magnitude * 
Order 
Pillai's Trace  .034 1.689(a) 2.000 97.000  .190 .034
   Wilks' Lambda  .966 1.689(a) 2.000 97.000  .190 .034
   Hotelling's Trace  .035 1.689(a) 2.000 97.000  .190 .034
Framing in Young Adults 52   Roy's Largest Root  .035 1.689(a) 2.000 97.000  .190 .034
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Pillai's Trace  .004 .179(a) 2.000 97.000  .836 .004
   Wilks' Lambda  .996 .179(a) 2.000 97.000  .836 .004
   Hotelling's Trace  .004 .179(a) 2.000 97.000  .836 .004
   Roy's Largest Root  .004 .179(a) 2.000 97.000  .836 .004
frame * risk  Pillai's Trace  .000 .023(a) 2.000 97.000  .977 .000
   Wilks' Lambda  1.000 .023(a) 2.000 97.000  .977 .000
   Hotelling's Trace  .000 .023(a) 2.000 97.000  .977 .000
   Roy's Largest Root  .000 .023(a) 2.000 97.000  .977 .000
frame * risk * 
Sex 
Pillai's Trace  .014 .702(a) 2.000 97.000  .498 .014
   Wilks' Lambda  .986 .702(a) 2.000 97.000  .498 .014
   Hotelling's Trace  .014 .702(a) 2.000 97.000  .498 .014
   Roy's Largest Root  .014 .702(a) 2.000 97.000  .498 .014
frame * risk * 
Order 
Pillai's Trace  .013 .647(a) 2.000 97.000  .526 .013
   Wilks' Lambda  .987 .647(a) 2.000 97.000  .526 .013
   Hotelling's Trace  .013 .647(a) 2.000 97.000  .526 .013
   Roy's Largest Root  .013 .647(a) 2.000 97.000  .526 .013
frame * risk * 
Sex  *  Order 
Pillai's Trace  .016 .779(a) 2.000 97.000  .462 .016
   Wilks' Lambda  .984 .779(a) 2.000 97.000  .462 .016
   Hotelling's Trace  .016 .779(a) 2.000 97.000  .462 .016
   Roy's Largest Root  .016 .779(a) 2.000 97.000  .462 .016
frame * 
magnitude 
Pillai's Trace  .055 2.815(a) 2.000 97.000  .065 .055
   Wilks' Lambda  .945 2.815(a) 2.000 97.000  .065 .055
   Hotelling's Trace  .058 2.815(a) 2.000 97.000  .065 .055





.025 1.220(a) 2.000 97.000  .300 .025
   Wilks' Lambda  .975 1.220(a) 2.000 97.000  .300 .025
   Hotelling's Trace  .025 1.220(a) 2.000 97.000  .300 .025





.013 .623(a) 2.000 97.000  .538 .013
   Wilks' Lambda  .987 .623(a) 2.000 97.000  .538 .013
   Hotelling's Trace  .013 .623(a) 2.000 97.000  .538 .013
   Roy's Largest Root  .013 .623(a) 2.000 97.000  .538 .013
frame * 
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Pillai's Trace 
.006 .310(a) 2.000 97.000  .735 .006
   Wilks' Lambda  .994 .310(a) 2.000 97.000  .735 .006
   Hotelling's Trace  .006 .310(a) 2.000 97.000  .735 .006
   Roy's Largest Root  .006 .310(a) 2.000 97.000  .735 .006
risk * magnitude  Pillai's Trace  .079 2.032(a) 4.000 95.000  .096 .079
   Wilks' Lambda  .921 2.032(a) 4.000 95.000  .096 .079
   Hotelling's Trace  .086 2.032(a) 4.000 95.000  .096 .079
   Roy's Largest Root  .086 2.032(a) 4.000 95.000  .096 .079
Framing in Young Adults 53 
risk * magnitude 
* Sex 
Pillai's Trace  .040 .982(a) 4.000 95.000  .421 .040
   Wilks' Lambda  .960 .982(a) 4.000 95.000  .421 .040
   Hotelling's Trace  .041 .982(a) 4.000 95.000  .421 .040
   Roy's Largest Root  .041 .982(a) 4.000 95.000  .421 .040
risk * magnitude 
* Order 
Pillai's Trace  .039 .975(a) 4.000 95.000  .425 .039
   Wilks' Lambda  .961 .975(a) 4.000 95.000  .425 .039
   Hotelling's Trace  .041 .975(a) 4.000 95.000  .425 .039
   Roy's Largest Root  .041 .975(a) 4.000 95.000  .425 .039
risk * magnitude 
* Sex  *  Order 
Pillai's Trace  .070 1.778(a) 4.000 95.000  .140 .070
   Wilks' Lambda  .930 1.778(a) 4.000 95.000  .140 .070
   Hotelling's Trace  .075 1.778(a) 4.000 95.000  .140 .070
   Roy's Largest Root  .075 1.778(a) 4.000 95.000  .140 .070
frame * risk * 
magnitude 
Pillai's Trace  .057 1.448(a) 4.000 95.000  .224 .057
   Wilks' Lambda  .943 1.448(a) 4.000 95.000  .224 .057
   Hotelling's Trace  .061 1.448(a) 4.000 95.000  .224 .057
   Roy's Largest Root  .061 1.448(a) 4.000 95.000  .224 .057




.037 .906(a) 4.000 95.000  .464 .037
   Wilks' Lambda  .963 .906(a) 4.000 95.000  .464 .037
   Hotelling's Trace  .038 .906(a) 4.000 95.000  .464 .037
   Roy's Largest Root  .038 .906(a) 4.000 95.000  .464 .037




.102 2.684(a) 4.000 95.000  .036 .102
   Wilks' Lambda  .898 2.684(a) 4.000 95.000  .036 .102
   Hotelling's Trace  .113 2.684(a) 4.000 95.000  .036 .102
   Roy's Largest Root  .113 2.684(a) 4.000 95.000  .036 .102
frame * risk * 
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Pillai's Trace 
.056 1.407(a) 4.000 95.000  .238 .056
   Wilks' Lambda  .944 1.407(a) 4.000 95.000  .238 .056
   Hotelling's Trace  .059 1.407(a) 4.000 95.000  .238 .056
   Roy's Largest Root  .059 1.407(a) 4.000 95.000  .238 .056
a  Exact statistic 
b  Design: Intercept+Sex+Order+Sex * Order  
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Measure: gamble
1.000 .000 0 . 1.000 1.000 1.000
.853 15.385 2 .000 .872 .914 .500
.881 12.336 2 .002 .893 .937 .500
.984 1.579 2 .454 .984 1.000 .500
.995 .457 2 .796 .995 1.000 .500
.892 11.001 9 .276 .948 1.000 .250
















Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional
to an identity matrix.
May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
a. 
Design: Intercept+Sex+Order+Sex * Order 
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Source    
Type III Sum 




frame  Sphericity Assumed  2.002 1 2.002 6.073  .015 .058
   Greenhouse-Geisser  2.002 1.000 2.002 6.073  .015 .058
   Huynh-Feldt  2.002 1.000 2.002 6.073  .015 .058
   Lower-bound  2.002 1.000 2.002 6.073  .015 .058
frame * Sex  Sphericity Assumed  1.260 1 1.260 3.824  .053 .038
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.260 1.000 1.260 3.824  .053 .038
   Huynh-Feldt  1.260 1.000 1.260 3.824  .053 .038
   Lower-bound  1.260 1.000 1.260 3.824  .053 .038
frame * Order  Sphericity Assumed  1.369 1 1.369 4.155  .044 .041
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.369 1.000 1.369 4.155  .044 .041
   Huynh-Feldt  1.369 1.000 1.369 4.155  .044 .041
   Lower-bound  1.369 1.000 1.369 4.155  .044 .041
frame * Sex  *  Order  Sphericity Assumed  .010 1 .010 .032  .859 .000
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .010 1.000 .010 .032  .859 .000
   Huynh-Feldt  .010 1.000 .010 .032  .859 .000
   Lower-bound  .010 1.000 .010 .032  .859 .000
Error(frame)  Sphericity Assumed  32.302 98 .330       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  32.302 98.000 .330       
   Huynh-Feldt  32.302 98.000 .330       
   Lower-bound  32.302 98.000 .330       
risk  Sphericity Assumed  3.413 2 1.706 7.583  .001 .072
   Greenhouse-Geisser  3.413 1.744 1.957 7.583  .001 .072
   Huynh-Feldt  3.413 1.827 1.867 7.583  .001 .072
   Lower-bound  3.413 1.000 3.413 7.583  .007 .072
risk * Sex  Sphericity Assumed  .061 2 .030 .135  .874 .001
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .061 1.744 .035 .135  .846 .001
   Huynh-Feldt  .061 1.827 .033 .135  .856 .001
   Lower-bound  .061 1.000 .061 .135  .714 .001
risk * Order  Sphericity Assumed  .198 2 .099 .440  .645 .004
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .198 1.744 .114 .440  .617 .004
   Huynh-Feldt  .198 1.827 .108 .440  .627 .004
   Lower-bound  .198 1.000 .198 .440  .509 .004
risk * Sex  *  Order  Sphericity Assumed  .054 2 .027 .121  .886 .001
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .054 1.744 .031 .121  .860 .001
   Huynh-Feldt  .054 1.827 .030 .121  .869 .001
   Lower-bound  .054 1.000 .054 .121  .729 .001
Error(risk)  Sphericity Assumed  44.105 196 .225       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  44.105 170.930 .258       
   Huynh-Feldt  44.105 179.094 .246       
   Lower-bound  44.105 98.000 .450       
magnitude  Sphericity Assumed  18.394 2 9.197 30.276  .000 .236
   Greenhouse-Geisser  18.394 1.787 10.295 30.276  .000 .236
   Huynh-Feldt  18.394 1.873 9.819 30.276  .000 .236
   Lower-bound  18.394 1.000 18.394 30.276  .000 .236
Framing in Young Adults 56magnitude * Sex  Sphericity Assumed  .129 2 .065 .213  .808 .002
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .129 1.787 .072 .213  .784 .002
   Huynh-Feldt  .129 1.873 .069 .213  .794 .002
   Lower-bound  .129 1.000 .129 .213  .646 .002
magnitude * Order  Sphericity Assumed  1.380 2 .690 2.271  .106 .023
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.380 1.787 .772 2.271  .112 .023
   Huynh-Feldt  1.380 1.873 .737 2.271  .110 .023
   Lower-bound  1.380 1.000 1.380 2.271  .135 .023
magnitude * Sex  *  
Order 
Sphericity Assumed  .148 2 .074 .243  .784 .002
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .148 1.787 .083 .243  .759 .002
   Huynh-Feldt  .148 1.873 .079 .243  .770 .002
   Lower-bound  .148 1.000 .148 .243  .623 .002
Error(magnitude)  Sphericity Assumed  59.539 196 .304       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  59.539 175.091 .340       
   Huynh-Feldt  59.539 183.584 .324       
   Lower-bound  59.539 98.000 .608       
frame * risk  Sphericity Assumed  .008 2 .004 .021  .980 .000
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .008 1.968 .004 .021  .978 .000
   Huynh-Feldt  .008 2.000 .004 .021  .980 .000
   Lower-bound  .008 1.000 .008 .021  .886 .000
frame * risk * Sex  Sphericity Assumed  .308 2 .154 .761  .469 .008
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .308 1.968 .156 .761  .467 .008
   Huynh-Feldt  .308 2.000 .154 .761  .469 .008
   Lower-bound  .308 1.000 .308 .761  .385 .008
frame * risk * Order  Sphericity Assumed  .276 2 .138 .682  .507 .007
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .276 1.968 .140 .682  .505 .007
   Huynh-Feldt  .276 2.000 .138 .682  .507 .007
   Lower-bound  .276 1.000 .276 .682  .411 .007
frame * risk * Sex  *  
Order 
Sphericity Assumed  .352 2 .176 .868  .421 .009
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .352 1.968 .179 .868  .420 .009
   Huynh-Feldt  .352 2.000 .176 .868  .421 .009
   Lower-bound  .352 1.000 .352 .868  .354 .009
Error(frame*risk)  Sphericity Assumed  39.676 196 .202       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  39.676 192.886 .206       
   Huynh-Feldt  39.676 196.000 .202       
   Lower-bound  39.676 98.000 .405       
frame * magnitude  Sphericity Assumed  1.045 2 .522 3.019  .051 .030
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.045 1.991 .525 3.019  .051 .030
   Huynh-Feldt  1.045 2.000 .522 3.019  .051 .030
   Lower-bound  1.045 1.000 1.045 3.019  .085 .030
frame * magnitude * 
Sex 
Sphericity Assumed  .408 2 .204 1.180  .309 .012
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .408 1.991 .205 1.180  .309 .012
   Huynh-Feldt  .408 2.000 .204 1.180  .309 .012
   Lower-bound  .408 1.000 .408 1.180  .280 .012
frame * magnitude * 
Order 
Sphericity Assumed  .214 2 .107 .617  .540 .006
Framing in Young Adults 57   Greenhouse-Geisser  .214 1.991 .107 .617  .540 .006
   Huynh-Feldt  .214 2.000 .107 .617  .540 .006
   Lower-bound  .214 1.000 .214 .617  .434 .006
frame * magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Sphericity Assumed  .115 2 .057 .331  .719 .003
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .115 1.991 .058 .331  .718 .003
   Huynh-Feldt  .115 2.000 .057 .331  .719 .003
   Lower-bound  .115 1.000 .115 .331  .566 .003
Error(frame*magnitu
de) 
Sphericity Assumed  33.912 196 .173       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  33.912 195.083 .174       
   Huynh-Feldt  33.912 196.000 .173       
   Lower-bound  33.912 98.000 .346       
risk * magnitude  Sphericity Assumed  1.259 4 .315 1.911  .108 .019
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.259 3.792 .332 1.911  .112 .019
   Huynh-Feldt  1.259 4.000 .315 1.911  .108 .019
   Lower-bound  1.259 1.000 1.259 1.911  .170 .019
risk * magnitude * 
Sex 
Sphericity Assumed  .526 4 .132 .799  .526 .008
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .526 3.792 .139 .799  .520 .008
   Huynh-Feldt  .526 4.000 .132 .799  .526 .008
   Lower-bound  .526 1.000 .526 .799  .374 .008
risk * magnitude * 
Order 
Sphericity Assumed  .547 4 .137 .831  .506 .008
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .547 3.792 .144 .831  .501 .008
   Huynh-Feldt  .547 4.000 .137 .831  .506 .008
   Lower-bound  .547 1.000 .547 .831  .364 .008
risk * magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Sphericity Assumed  1.192 4 .298 1.810  .126 .018
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.192 3.792 .314 1.810  .130 .018
   Huynh-Feldt  1.192 4.000 .298 1.810  .126 .018
   Lower-bound  1.192 1.000 1.192 1.810  .182 .018
Error(risk*magnitude
) 
Sphericity Assumed  64.544 392 .165       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  64.544 371.572 .174       
   Huynh-Feldt  64.544 392.000 .165       
   Lower-bound  64.544 98.000 .659       
frame * risk * 
magnitude 
Sphericity Assumed  .898 4 .224 1.467  .211 .015
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .898 3.781 .237 1.467  .214 .015
   Huynh-Feldt  .898 4.000 .224 1.467  .211 .015
   Lower-bound  .898 1.000 .898 1.467  .229 .015
frame * risk * 
magnitude * Sex 
Sphericity Assumed  .596 4 .149 .974  .422 .010
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .596 3.781 .158 .974  .419 .010
   Huynh-Feldt  .596 4.000 .149 .974  .422 .010
   Lower-bound  .596 1.000 .596 .974  .326 .010
frame * risk * 
magnitude * Order 
Sphericity Assumed  1.385 4 .346 2.263  .062 .023
   Greenhouse-Geisser  1.385 3.781 .366 2.263  .066 .023
   Huynh-Feldt  1.385 4.000 .346 2.263  .062 .023
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   Lower-bound  1.385 1.000 1.385 2.263  .136 .023
frame * risk * 
magnitude * Sex  *  
Order 
Sphericity Assumed 
.759 4 .190 1.239  .294 .012
   Greenhouse-Geisser  .759 3.781 .201 1.239  .294 .012
   Huynh-Feldt  .759 4.000 .190 1.239  .294 .012
   Lower-bound  .759 1.000 .759 1.239  .268 .012
Error(frame*risk*ma
gnitude) 
Sphericity Assumed  59.976 392 .153       
   Greenhouse-Geisser  59.976 370.537 .162       
   Huynh-Feldt  59.976 392.000 .153       
   Lower-bound  59.976 98.000 .612       
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Measure: gamble  
Source  frame  risk  magnitude 
Type III Sum 
of Squares  df 
Mean 
Square  F  Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
frame  Linear        2.002 1 2.002 6.073  .015 .058
frame * Sex  Linear        1.260 1 1.260 3.824  .053 .038
frame * 
Order 
Linear        1.369 1 1.369 4.155  .044 .041
frame * Sex  
*  Order 
Linear        .010 1 .010 .032  .859 .000
Error(frame)  Linear        32.302 98 .330       
risk     Linear     3.411 1 3.411 11.341  .001 .104
      Quadratic     .002 1 .002 .011  .918 .000
risk * Sex     Linear     .059 1 .059 .195  .660 .002
      Quadratic     .002 1 .002 .014  .907 .000
risk * Order     Linear     .077 1 .077 .256  .614 .003
      Quadratic     .121 1 .121 .812  .370 .008
risk * Sex  *  
Order 
   Linear     .012 1 .012 .040  .841 .000
      Quadratic     .042 1 .042 .283  .596 .003
Error(risk)     Linear     29.478 98 .301       
      Quadratic     14.627 98 .149       
magnitude        Linear  17.866 1 17.866 44.185  .000 .311
         Quadratic  .528 1 .528 2.599  .110 .026
magnitude * 
Sex 
      Linear  .073 1 .073 .181  .671 .002
         Quadratic  .056 1 .056 .276  .600 .003
magnitude * 
Order 
      Linear  1.297 1 1.297 3.208  .076 .032
         Quadratic  .083 1 .083 .406  .525 .004
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
      Linear  .146 1 .146 .362  .549 .004
         Quadratic  .001 1 .001 .007  .934 .000
Error(magnit
ude) 
      Linear  39.625 98 .404       
         Quadratic  19.915 98 .203       
frame * risk  Linear  Linear     .002 1 .002 .009  .924 .000
      Quadratic     .006 1 .006 .034  .855 .000
frame * risk * 
Sex 
Linear  Linear     .103 1 .103 .479  .490 .005
      Quadratic     .205 1 .205 1.080  .301 .011
frame * risk * 
Order 
Linear  Linear     .276 1 .276 1.280  .261 .013
      Quadratic     .000 1 .000 .002  .967 .000
frame * risk * 
Sex  *  Order 
Linear  Linear     .173 1 .173 .802  .373 .008
      Quadratic     .179 1 .179 .944  .334 .010
Error(frame*r
isk) 
Linear  Linear     21.100 98 .215       
      Quadratic     18.576 98 .190       
frame * 
magnitude 
Linear     Linear  .038 1 .038 .230  .633 .002




Linear     Linear 
.166 1 .166 1.004  .319 .010
         Quadratic  .243 1 .243 1.340  .250 .013
frame * 
magnitude * 
Linear     Linear  .047 1 .047 .284  .595 .003
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         Quadratic  .167 1 .167 .921  .340 .009
frame * 
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Linear     Linear 
.043 1 .043 .260  .611 .003
         Quadratic  .072 1 .072 .396  .531 .004
Error(frame*
magnitude) 
Linear     Linear  16.156 98 .165       
         Quadratic  17.756 98 .181       
risk * 
magnitude 
   Linear  Linear  .723 1 .723 3.915  .051 .038
         Quadratic  .224 1 .224 1.429  .235 .014
      Quadratic  Linear  .000 1 .000 .002  .967 .000




   Linear  Linear 
.004 1 .004 .019  .890 .000
         Quadratic  1.33E-005 1 1.33E-005 .000  .993 .000
      Quadratic  Linear  .518 1 .518 3.644  .059 .036




   Linear  Linear 
.008 1 .008 .046  .831 .000
         Quadratic  .073 1 .073 .463  .498 .005
      Quadratic  Linear  .339 1 .339 2.381  .126 .024
         Quadratic  .128 1 .128 .730  .395 .007
risk * 
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
   Linear  Linear 
.041 1 .041 .221  .640 .002
         Quadratic  .040 1 .040 .256  .614 .003
      Quadratic  Linear  .190 1 .190 1.333  .251 .013
         Quadratic  .922 1 .922 5.266  .024 .051
Error(risk*ma
gnitude) 
   Linear  Linear  18.102 98 .185       
         Quadratic  15.353 98 .157       
      Quadratic  Linear  13.935 98 .142       
         Quadratic  17.155 98 .175       
frame * risk * 
magnitude 
Linear  Linear  Linear  .161 1 .161 .844  .360 .009
         Quadratic  .166 1 .166 1.061  .305 .011
      Quadratic  Linear  .519 1 .519 3.325  .071 .033
         Quadratic  .052 1 .052 .474  .493 .005
frame * risk * 
magnitude * 
Sex 
Linear  Linear  Linear 
.005 1 .005 .028  .867 .000
         Quadratic  .283 1 .283 1.808  .182 .018
      Quadratic  Linear  .230 1 .230 1.470  .228 .015
         Quadratic  .078 1 .078 .720  .398 .007
frame * risk * 
magnitude * 
Order 
Linear  Linear  Linear 
.730 1 .730 3.824  .053 .038
         Quadratic  .148 1 .148 .947  .333 .010
      Quadratic  Linear  .080 1 .080 .515  .475 .005
         Quadratic  .427 1 .427 3.929  .050 .039
frame * risk * 
magnitude * 
Sex  *  Order 
Linear  Linear  Linear 
.026 1 .026 .138  .711 .001
         Quadratic  .307 1 .307 1.965  .164 .020
      Quadratic  Linear  .113 1 .113 .722  .398 .007
         Quadratic  .312 1 .312 2.873  .093 .028
Error(frame*r Linear  Linear  Linear  18.697 98 .191       
Framing in Young Adults 61isk*magnitud
e) 
         Quadratic  15.320 98 .156       
      Quadratic  Linear  15.307 98 .156       




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: gamble
Transformed Variable: Average
490.151 1 490.151 892.751 .000 .901
2.194 1 2.194 3.997 .048 .039
2.653 1 2.653 4.832 .030 .047


















.619 .021 .578 .660






.660 .036 .588 .732










.573 .029 .516 .631
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Measure: gamble
.579 .026 .527 .631









.681 .027 .627 .735
.620 .027 .567 .674











.749 .030 .689 .809
.647 .029 .590 .705









7. Gender * Order
Measure: gamble
.588 .050 .488 .688
.732 .053 .628 .837
.558 .028 .502 .615













8. Gender * frame
Measure: gamble
.589 .046 .498 .680
.731 .046 .639 .823
.569 .025 .520 .618
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Measure: gamble
.501 .036 .429 .573
.645 .037 .573 .718
.657 .037 .583 .732













10. Gender * Order * frame
Measure: gamble
.481 .064 .355 .608
.694 .064 .567 .821
.697 .066 .565 .829
.768 .067 .635 .900
.520 .036 .450 .591
.596 .036 .525 .668
.618 .034 .550 .686






















11. Gender * risk
Measure: gamble
.713 .048 .618 .809
.664 .047 .570 .757
.604 .052 .501 .707
.649 .026 .597 .700
.577 .026 .526 .628
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Measure: gamble
.633 .038 .557 .709
.561 .038 .486 .636
.526 .041 .444 .607
.729 .039 .652 .807
.680 .039 .603 .756















14. frame * risk
Measure: gamble
.639 .038 .563 .714
.584 .036 .512 .656
.515 .036 .445 .586
.724 .034 .656 .792
.657 .039 .580 .733















15. Gender * frame * risk
Measure: gamble
.641 .067 .508 .775
.614 .064 .487 .740
.513 .063 .389 .637
.785 .060 .666 .905
.713 .068 .578 .848
.694 .066 .563 .826
.636 .036 .564 .708
.554 .034 .486 .623
.518 .034 .451 .585
.662 .032 .598 .727
.600 .037 .527 .673


























Framing in Young Adults 6518. Gender * magnitude
Measure: gamble
.777 .053 .671 .882
.698 .051 .596 .800
.506 .054 .398 .613
.722 .029 .665 .778
.597 .028 .542 .652















19. Order * magnitude
Measure: gamble
.737 .042 .653 .820
.613 .041 .533 .694
.370 .043 .284 .455
.761 .043 .676 .847
.682 .042 .599 .764















21. frame * magnitude
Measure: gamble
.723 .038 .648 .798
.568 .041 .487 .650
.447 .038 .372 .521
.775 .036 .705 .846
.727 .036 .656 .797
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Measure: gamble
.742 .066 .611 .874
.568 .072 .425 .711
.457 .066 .326 .588
.811 .063 .687 .935
.828 .063 .704 .953
.554 .069 .417 .691
.703 .036 .632 .774
.568 .039 .491 .646
.436 .036 .366 .507
.740 .034 .673 .807
.625 .034 .558 .692


























25. risk * magnitude
Measure: gamble
.757 .039 .679 .835
.748 .039 .672 .825
.538 .046 .446 .630
.765 .040 .687 .844
.618 .043 .533 .703
.478 .044 .390 .565
.725 .040 .645 .804
.576 .046 .485 .667
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Measure: gamble
.680 .054 .572 .788
.692 .056 .582 .803
.543 .060 .424 .663
.783 .053 .679 .888
.529 .059 .411 .647
.439 .057 .325 .553
.704 .055 .596 .813
.484 .060 .364 .603
.358 .055 .249 .466
.834 .046 .742 .926
.805 .050 .705 .905
.533 .059 .416 .650
.747 .054 .641 .854
.707 .056 .595 .819
.516 .059 .400 .632
.745 .054 .639 .852
.669 .057 .555 .782








































.7124 102 .31827 .03151
.7549 102 .30008 .02971
.5686 102 .34337 .03400
.6699 102 .30935 .03063
.4412 102 .32889 .03256






































-.04248 .35929 .03558 -.11306 .02809 -1.194 101 .235
-.10131 .42680 .04226 -.18514 -.01748 -2.397 101 .018







































































































































































































































































































































1  -.446**  .402**  -.135 -.070 -.185 .148  -.062 -.247*  .000  -.173 -.061 .426**  .094  -.557** 
Global 
Benefits 




.402**  -.422**  1  .018 .025 -.111  .233*  -.083  -.049  .120 .183 -.091  .351**  -.040  -.390** 
Quan Risk 
Perception 
-.135 .078  .018  1  -.093 -.003 -.028 .054  .303**  .044  .224* -.166 .003  .192  .183 
Overall 
Gamble 
-.070  .088 .025 -.093  1  .179 -.040  .098 .032 .785**  .046 .006 -.067  -.210*  -.017 
Sensation 
Seeking 
-.185 .232* -.111 -.003 .179  1  -.271*  .434**  .010  .216* .084  -.092 -.293**  -.259*  .124 
Behavioral 
Inhibition 
.148  -.210*  ,233* -.028 -.040 -.271*  1  -.092 -.159 .075  -.019 -.125 .381**  -.089 -.137 
Behavioral 
Activation  




-.247*  .120 -.049  .303**  .032 .010 -.159  -.045  1  .186 .069 -.278**  -.234*  .109 .471** 
Gamble in 
Gain 








-.061 -.018 -.091 -.166 .006  -.092 -.125 -.086 -.278**  -.614**  -.122 1  -.029 -.067 -.016 
Categorical 
risk 
.426**  -.261*  .351**  .003  -.067 -.293**  .381**  -.035 -.234*  -.002 -.040 -.029 1  .106  -.319** 
Intentions 
to use Birth 
Control 
.094 .003 -.040  .192 -.210*  -.259*  -.089  .017 .109 -.147  -.069  -.067  .106 1  .132 
Intentions 
to have sex 
-.557**  .533**  -.390**  .183  -.017 .124  -.137 .230* .471**  -.015 .217* -.016 -.319**  .132  1 
 
Table 1  ** significant @ 0.01; * significant @ 0.05 
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Framing in Young Adults 71Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Proportion of times gamble chosen in each frame. 
Figure 2. Proportion of times gamble chosen at varying levels of risk, regardless of 
frame. 
Figure 3. Proportion of times gamble chosen at different magnitude levels, regardless of 
frame.  
Figure 4. Proportion of times gamble chosen at different levels of magnitude in each 
frame (frame*magnitude interaction). 
Figure 5. Proportion of times gamble chosen in each frame as a function of gender 
(frame*gender interaction). 
Figure 6. Proportion of times gamble chosen in each frame as a function of order of 
presentation of gain and loss frame blocks (frame*order interaction). 
 







































































































Risk Level (Probability of Winning Gamble)   
 




















































Effect of Magnitude on Choice
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